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The Use of Distribution
' Functions to Represent Utility Functions
We are considering an individual whose evaluation and consequent
choice of actions is accomplished through the use of the expected
utility hypothesis [7], For our purposes it is assximed, that the
individual has uncertainty only with respect to a dollar amount w.
Letting v(w) be the individual's utility on the dollar amount w,
we will make the common assumption that this utility function is
increasing on w with upper and lower bounds. It is then cleeur that
there exists a linear transformation on any utility function of
this form which will give us the utility function in tb6 form of a
distribution function. Since linear transformations do not
affect either the individual's ciioices or his certainty equivalent
then any utility function satisfying the above restrictions could
be converted to a distribution function without altering the indivi-
dual's,preferences for various decisions.
As it turns out there are advantages to having the utility
function represented by a distribution function. In the first place
there are a wide variety of standard distribution functions so
sufficient flexibility exists to adapt this concept to a significant
number of applications. In addition, these utility functions are
.
easier to communicate, can serve as first approximations, form_a
basis for illustration, and are useful in easing the analysis of
many types of problems. The widely used exponential utility function,
CS, p, 255] and [2, p, 90] among many others, can be viewed as a
distribution function of the exponential density function.
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This paper exploits the use of standard distribution functions by-
taking advantage of their mathematical properties to determine the
individual's certainty equivalent (fixed amount for which he would be
indifferent between it and the uncertain payoff) as a function of the
peO'ameters of the distribution function and the parameters of the density
function on the uncertain end state w. The parameters of the density
function on w are , to some extent , controlled by the individual through
his choice of a decision. Thus the individual will choose an action
that is associated with the parameters resulting in an optimal certainty
equivalent. For this reason it is desirable to have the certainty
equivalent as a function of these parameters.
In addition we relate our results to the risk premitim (expected
monetary value minus certainty equivalent). The risk premium is a
widely used concept, [2], [8] and [10] among others. It is' useful
as a measure of risk aversion although it is not the only measure of
risk aversion, see [iDi C'^] and [8],
The results are also useful for purposes of estimation. If
we assume that an individual's utility function is from a specific
family of distribution functions and in addition we have data on
certainty equivalents for various gambles along with the probability
distributions on the payoffs then we can estimate the parameters of
that individual's utility function. This procedure was used by
Berhold [2] to estimate the utility function for a large government
contractor under the assumption that it was an exponential utility
function.

As we said, the individual is , in effect, choosing the paraneters
of the probability distrioution on w. For a specific class or type of
probability distributions (Gaussian, binomial, etc.) we can characterize
the probability distribution by certain parameters (a and p for the
Gaussian distribution). V/e are letting a vector, denoted by a, index
these distributions, thus a = [a., a^ ..., a ]. For example, with
the Gaussian distribution, we could let a^ = y and a„ = a, where n = 2.
In general i%'e will let w = x (a;z) where the probability distribution
on z is not a function of the decision. For example, z can have a
standard Gaussian distribution (zero mean and unit variance) and let
x(a;z) = za + \i. '
Next we will augment the individual's payoff by a money amount
h(a) (positive or negative). So his net payoff will be
1) x(a;z) + h(a)
where h(a°) = and a° is an arbitrary vector. Later v;e will make a**
more specific. We define h(a) as a dollar amount such that
2) Ev rx(a;z) + h(a)J = Ev T x(a°;z) + h(a°)l .
So in taking the partial derivative of (2) we get
3) E<v' r / \ ^ !./
^'^ r3x(a;z) 3h(a)l[x(aiz) + h(a)J L^^~^ + -^j
for all i, [i=l, , n], where the p(z[a) is a constant for all a. This
will not restrict us to any extent. And since 8h(a)/3a^ is constant for
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all z, then
., , s E{3x(a;z)/3a. v'Cx(a;z) + h(a)]}
J,
\ an(a.) i
'
3a. ^ ' E{v'Lx(a;z) + h(a)J)
1
We can nov; make an observation that allows us to derive some
significant results in addition to providing a basis for subsequent
developments along the same line. Using the relationship in (U) we
want to exploit the general result that
^. v '(K) p(K)
^^ ELvt(K)J
satisfies the requirements of a probability measure on K (non-negative,
c'lms to 1), since v (•) is strictly increasing in money and has upper
and lower :i&uT>ds. This leads us to the consideration of distribution
functions as utility funcLi-ris.
Using well-known distribution functions would result in v'(«) being
a well-known density function. Thus, we could use the known characteristics
o- the density function as well as its tabled values. The distribution
function Hc.^ the desirable characteristics of being strictly increasing
and having upper bu, ' lower bounds. These characteristics are commonly
required of utility func^-_.ns defined on money amounts.
So assuming the utility fuw-
-ion is a distribution function, we
can then view v'[x(a;z) + h(a)] as a cc^ditional probability distribution
on a given z, say p(a|z). This is not Lo sa;, that there is actually a
conditional probability distribution on a. '.1^ msi'siy want to take

advantage of the_ fact that it can satisfy the requirements of a
probability measure.
For the time being; let us adopt the fiction that v'(.;z) is a
probability distribution on the action a given z. Then in terms of Bayes
Theorem we get
P.\ n(^,\^\ - v'[x(a'2) -f h(a)] p(z)
' L v' Lx(aizT+ n(a)
J
where TT(z]a) is tne posterior density function. Thus we can take
advantage of results for posterior density functions, see [9] and [10],
As an illustration let the Gaussian distribution function represent
the utility function with parameters y and a . Let the profit have a
Gaussian distribution v;ith parameters y and a and a = [a^ , a^3 where
a^ = p and a„ = o. Thus, we have p(z) as the standard Gaussian
distribution with a standard deviation of 1 and a mean of zero. The
profit function is
7) xCy, a;z) = p + zo.
We will let a° be a^ = u° and a^ = a°.
When x(a;z) has a normal distribution it is immediately clear
that
8) h(p,a) = g(0;y) - p + y|
where p is used to index the function g(a). So, using (6) we next get
d g(o;p) = - E[zTr(z|a) da].
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Next we will determine Ti(2|a). The constants will be ignored until
the end because we knov; 7T(z|a) is a density function and it will turn
out to be a well-known type. Since the denominator of (6) is a
constant, it can be immediately dropped. Thus,
9) Tr(zlo) « exp <- 1/2 (z-M)/S i
where M=[y
-M-g(a;ij)]/o
exD <- 1/2 z
S = a /0.
o
To obtain the mean of the posterior distribution we use a result from
Schlaifer [11, p. 441] and get
10) d g (a;vi) = - E ^z 7r(z a))
H/S
1 + (1/S^)
M/(S' + 1).
Rearranging v/e get
a[u^ - U - g(c;p)3.
2 2
a + a
o
11) d g(a;u)
g(a;y) + w - U,
g d g
2 2
a t o
o
and on integrating
12) Log [g(a;y) t p - w ]
0*
1/2 log [a^ + 0^]
And since g(0;vi) = then

_7-
13) r' Log
g(a:-.-;M) + p - u
= Loj 1 +
1/2
In the follov;ing we will deal only v;ith O;-.- so to simplify we will
drop the '". Consequently,
14) g(o;u) = {p - p^} 1 +
We would like to pause here a moment in order to relate g(a;y) to the
concept of a risk premium. The risk premium is the expected monetary
value minus the certainty cash equivalent. The certainty cash equivalent
or simply certainty equivalent is a fixed money amount c(a) such that
the individual is indifferent between choosing either c(a) or the
uncertain amount Cx(a;z) + h(a)]. In other words c(a) is a dollar
amount such that
15) Ev [x(ajz) + h(a)] = v [c(a)].
It is clear that c(a) = p when a = [p, 0], The risk premium is a money
amount R(a) v/here
16) R(a) = E [x(a;z) + h(a)] - c(a)
So from (15) and (8) we get
17) c(y,a) = p + g(a;p) - p + p° - R(p,a) = c{p°,0)
Consequently,
18) R(p,a) = g(a;p)
which holds for all cases where x(a,z) has a normal distribution.

The result^ in (lU) confirms our intuition in the following manner:
We would intuitively expect R(a,y) to be strictly increasing (decreasing)
in a if y > (<) y . Vie would also expect R(o,y) to be strictly decreasing
(increasing) in o if y > (<) y , In fact, Lim R(a,y) = \i - \i
o
and Lim
^ ^
R(o,y) = 0. And if a =0, then P [v < c] + P [v < l-c] : 1,
o
e > 0. In other words, there are two outcomes ( in an approximate
sense); maximum utility (v = 1) and minimum utility (v = 0). Taking
the partial derivative of (14) with respect to y we get
19)
9 gjoiv)
3U. <1
1 +
1/2
< 0,
Verbally the individual has a lower risk premium as y increases,
Taking the partial derivative with respect to a we get
20) i_£l£ilil [y %^ 1 +
1/2
< 0.
Verbally the individual has a lower risk premium as o increases
.
Besides being strictly increasing, having upper and lower bounds,
the Gaussian distribution also has tv/o other characteristics: I, Two
parameters, y and a , which can be used to define an individual's utility
function and II. A risk aversive portion {\i > u ) and a risk preference
portion (y < y ). The Gaussian utility function (as denoted here) has
o
sufficient flexibility in terms of the above characteristics to match
or sufficiently approximate utility functions for many individuals. In
addition, it is a well-known function and widely tabulated. Thus, the
Gaussian utility function could be of immediate use.
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To further illustrate : if
21) v(k) = 1 - l/2(n)ey.p C-2nK3, whex^e n > 0,
then the agent has an exponential utility function. Observe that if
n = 1/2, then this is a distribution function on K >_ . Proceeding
as before v;e get
2
22) Tr(zla)«exp {-2n Iza + u + g(a;M)] exp (-z /2}
= exp { -M/2}
2
where M = z t 4nza + 4riH + '+rig(a;p)
Rearranging and completing the square we get
23) M = z^ + Unzo + (2na)^ -(2ncr)^ + ^nM + Ur,r(a;p).
The last three terns are constants for a given value of a so they
drop out . Thus
,
24) Ti(zla) « exp { - (z + 2na) /2}
So z has a Gaussian distribution v/ith a mean -2rio and a standard
deviation of one. Consequently,
25) E {zTi(z a)} = - 2na
so from (4)
26) d g{a;y) = 2nada.
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We note that tliis is independent of y'. On integration and evaluation
between and 0;v we get
27) h(o-;:) = na?.
Dropping « then fron (18) we observe that R(M,a) = no . Equation (27)
is confirmed by Fruend's results [5, p. 255],
Berhold obtained an estimate of n = '+.25 x 10* for a governTTient
contractor using the relationship in (27), [2, p. 101], And this vms
used as a basis for determining the optimal sharing ratio in government
incentive contracts [3].
If the probability distribution on x(a;z) has only one parameter
then our problem is somev/hat simplified, './e let
28) x[u, a;y] = v - u(a) t y
where y .is an arbitrary constant and y(a) = E(y|a). Since the probability
distribution on y contains the parameter we make a transformation to
remove it. For example if y has an exponential distribution with a
mean of X > then we let Xz = y. Conseq.uently
29) x[y,X,2] = u - X + Xz
where z has an exponential distribution vfith a mean of one. The
decision maker can then choose X.
Furthermore, if v;e use an exponential utility function:
30) v(k) = 1 - ^ exp [-^k2, K > 0;
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on the money amount k , then
31)
-nCzlx) « exp {-(j) [y - X + Az + h(X)3}exp C-z]
= exp {-<j)p t X(f - A(}>z - $h(X) - 2}
« exp {-[X(J) + 1] z}
Using (H) and integrating from to X..., we get
32) h(X.^) = X... - {1/9} {LnCX,..<> + 1]}.
As before v;e v/ill drop the " henceforth.
In the same manner as before we get
33) c(a) = M + h(a) - R(a) = c(a°) = y
where a° is the value of the parameter such that variance of y is zero.
For the exponential distribution this would be where X = 0. Thus we
get R(a) = h(a).
We observe R(0) = and R'(X) > for all X > 0. This result
confirms our intuition. Intuitively we v;ould also assume
34) dR(X) ^
Verbally the decision maker has a lower risk premium as <p increases.
This would mean:
35) Ln [X (f + 1] > ^
*
X <1) + 1
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On expanding tlife' logarithriic series [6, p. 373] we get
36) ma * * i: = .^^ .
^'^[rrr-]
'
which confirms (35).
The results we have obtained thus far can be used as a basis
for estimating utility functions along the lines suggested earlier.
It would be useful to have other corrtbinations of utility functions
and pr^ability distributions. This can be facilitateci a great deal
through the use of conjugate distributions [9, p. U?]. In addition,
^ture research should also deal with more complicated payoff functions.
However, at this point it v:ould seem that sufficient results have
been presented so as to evaluate the usefulness of the basic conce^it.
Even if the concept does not accurately reflect reality (in the sense
that people do not actually have Gaussian utility functions) it should
still be useful as a first approximation because of the computational
simplicity.
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